ORIGINALNI NAUČNI RADOVI/SCIENTIFIC PAPERS

IntroductIon
Corporations came into being in the Middle Ages with the benevolent purpose of creating opportunities for monasteries, colleges, hospitals and other social institutions to contribute to the society's welfare as independent legal entities. In the seventeenth century, the establishment of profit-making corporations marks the beginning of a new economic era distinguished for accumulation of huge capitals, attenuation and depersonalization of ownership and green light for limited liability, limited responsibility respectively. After the Second World War a period of founding transnational corporations and concentrating huge economical and political power in their hands commences. Today we are living in a world, in which 51 of the 100 largest economies are corporations and 49 are countries (Anderson and Cavanagh 000). "Сorporations create the larger share of the wealth of nations and determine the manner in which it is created yet they are not directly accountable to the people on who they depend for their existence" (Turnbull 003) . Legal irresponsibility and anonymity of corporate ownership imply two acute problems in corporations, known as "veil of incorporation" and "externalization of costs". We believe that a reversal to the inherent nature of the corporation "uniting in one body" 3 the interests of all for whom it is created is imperative and that the social responsibility of corporate capital should be placed to the fore. 1 Lazonick, W., R. Dore and H. W. de Jong (1997) Based on a comparison of corporate sales and country GDPs 3 "Corporation" means "united in one body" (from Latin "corporatus", past participle of "corporare" -to form into a body)
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contEMPorArY corPorAtE GoVErnAncE -SHIFtInG oF tHE AccEntS
In views about the essence and function of corporation and corporate governance, accents are gradually shifting towards a broader and more dynamic perspective. The corporation is turning from a mere instrument for providing the shareholders' well-being into an important social institution exerting strong influence on the community's life. Corporate governance is turning from a mere mechanism for maximizing shareholder value into a mechanism for balancing the interests of a variety of corporate stakeholders who are considered to be of vital importance for the survival of the corporation. These accents have always been placed in a different manner by the Anglo-Saxon and by the European systems of corporate governance, which results in different acuteness of three other problems typical for the corporate structure -principal-agent problem, free-rider problem and power vacuum problem.
In section two the shifting of the accents in the concepts of the corporation is presented and in section three the problems typical for the corporate structure are discussed. Subsequently, these ideas are applied to compare between AngloSaxon and European corporations 4 .
corPorAtIon And corPorAtE GoVErnAncE
tHE concEPtS
By chronologically reviewing the concepts of the corporation (Figure 1 ) one can observe shifting from a narrow towards a broader and more open perspective and a propensity to widening the corporate boundaries. The nominalistic concept considers the corporation as a product of law, legal fiction serving as a nexus for contracting relationships, complex version of standard contractual governance (Alchian and Demsetz 197; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Williamson 1985; Alchian and Woodward 1988) . One of the first known definitions describes the corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law" 5 . According to this concept the corporate form is just a legal way for optimizing the contractual relations between the business partners by significantly minimizing the transaction costs. Grossman and Hart's property rights concept, which describes the firm as being composed of the assets that it owns or over which it has control, draws the attention to the shareholders' property rights as well as to corporate control in the world of incomplete contracts. According to this concept the shareholders are corporation's residual claimants. "We do not distinguish between ownership and control and virtually define own-4 In this paper we agree to the generally accepted classification of corporate governance models into Anglo-Saxon and European, as it is shown in Table 1 5 Chief Justice Marshall, 1819, cited in Ribstein (003), р. 5 ership as the power to exercise control" (Grossman and Hart 1986) . The systemic concept of the corporation proposes quite a broader definition of the corporation as "a nexus of specific investments: a combination of mutually specialized assets and people" (Zingales 1997 ). According to this concept the corporate form provides synergy between the different components of the system and thus achieves higher economical efficiency. All corporate stakeholders (shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, consumers, local community, natural environment) are considered to have a vital importance for the survival of the firm. Jensen, who in 1977 fears the destroying of the corporation under the pressure of social responsibility (Jensen and Meckling 1977) , admits in 001 that "a firm cannot maximize value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders" (Jensen 001). The corporate citizen concept (Habisch 003, Schrader 003 ) regards corporations as citizens of the civil society -a position that imposes certain civil duties upon the corporate citizens (respecting other citizens' rights, not doing any harm etc.). According to this concept corporations are rather social than economical institutions, which are in perpetual interaction with their environment and have a vital impact on the society's life. Human capital is regarded as company's most crucial asset. A transition towards knowledge based society is indicated and corporations are considered to be playing an important role as innovative and creative elements of the society (Drucker 000).
In consonance with the evolution of the corporate concepts there is also a trend towards defining corporate governance in some broader boundaries. The term "corporate governance" was first used by Eells in 1960 to denote "the structure and functioning of the corporate polity" (Becht et. al 00). For some contemporary authors corporate governance is equal to "protection of the investors' interests" (Mayer 1996) , "ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment" (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . However the majority consent to the broader definitions of the corporation and take the view that corporate governance refers to: "the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations consistent with the public good" (Monks 1998) ; "holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals" (Cadbury 1999) 6 ; "resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the resolution of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders" (Becht et al. 00); "balancing the rights and interests of multiple stakeholders (i.e., management, the corporation, shareholders, creditors, employees and other stakeholders)" (Berglöf and Claessens 004). Halal (001) states that if corporate governance is able to unify stakeholders' interests into a productive whole, 6 cited in Iskander and Chamlou (000) Petya Dankova business could be transformed into an institution that is designed to serve both capital and society.
In Figure 1 the above described shifting of the accents is presented. Concepts about the corporation are placed in a pyramid; a table summarizes the characteristics of each level of the pyramid. At the bottom of the pyramid we place the corporation which strives for maximizing the shareholder value, resting on the view that shareholders are the most important constituencies and that social responsibility of business is to maximize its profits. It is a corporation with narrow closed boundaries and short time horizons. We call this corporation "narrow corporation". Moving up the pyramid we reach the open and creative corporation which considers the inputs of all stakeholders important for its long-term survival and strives for the welfare of all of them, i.e. at maximizing the stakeholder value. We call this corporation "broad corporation".
coMPArISon bEtwEEn AnGlo-SAxon And EuroPEAn corPorAtIonS In tErMS oF tHE concEPtS
In our view, Anglo-Saxon corporations are located in the lower part of the pyramid, staying close to the "narrow corporation"; European corporations are located in the upper part of the pyramid, staying close to the "broad corporation". Our statement is based on comparison between both corporate governance models in terms of following indicators: boundaries of the corporation; value to be reached; time horizon; attitude towards employees; structure and composition of the board.
Within the boundaries of the Anglo-Saxon corporation, exclusively managers and shareholders are included. Shareholders are considered to be bearer of the residual risk and therefore residual claimants. Main aim of the corporation is maximizing shareholder value, as expressed in its share price. Holding the investors' interest for the company and high share prices rely on quarterly paid cash dividends (Cunningham 000). In USA, 85 per cent of the profit after taxes was directed to dividend payments in 000, compared to 1960 when this percentage was about 44 (Inozemtsev 00). Paying high dividends reduces the earnings retained for future development investment. According to Lazonick, American and British corporate systems "show a market propensity […] to live off the past rather than invest for the future -to extract value rather than create value" (Lazonick et al. 1997 ). The obsession with share prices results in an inevitable shortening of time horizons. Another strategy for raising the share prices is buying and selling businesses. "It is a far quicker way to boost your balance sheet and share price than relying on organic growth and, for those on the top, can be much more interesting. The fact that most mergers and acquisitions do not, in the end, add value has not discouraged many executives from trying" (Handy 000). Em-pirical evidence shows that the European corporation is expected to be a source of not only shareholders' welfare. When asked what their priorities were with regard to dividends and employee layoffs, 89 per cent of the executives in USA and UK gave priority to high dividend payments. 51 per cent of the German and 95 per cent of the Japanese executives declare preference for stable employment (Allen and Gale 00). As the World Bank's Framework for Implementation of Corporate Governance states, "the German system of corporate governance […] reflects a different concept of the company's role, as being both social and economic (Iskander and Chamlou 000). A typical feature of the European corporation is its long-term orientation based on preference for reinvesting major part of the profit and on openess to a broader circle of constituencies. These differences can be traced back to the structure of the corporate ownership. Minority shareholders act rather as stock market speculators who are chasing after quick returns than as owners who are interested in the survival and development of their property (Monks and Minow 1991, Janisch 199, Handy 00) . Majority shareholders by contrast, prefer reinvesting the major part of the company's profit as well as raising its future value and its public image. As Drucker writes, German banks, Japanese keiretsu and Italian conglomerates are much less concerned about the market value of their shares as they do not intend to sell them.
There are considerable differences between Anglo-Saxon and European corporate governance models with regard to their attitude towards employees -a fact that is supported by the above cited empirical data, as well as by data about employees' remuneration. CEOs in USA earn more than 400 times the wages of their lowest-paid workers (Handy 000). While the average after-tax earnings of American wage and salary earners fell by 13 per cent during the 1970s and 1980s, the real average after-tax compensation of CEOs […] increased by 400 per cent. In 1990 the salary and bonus compensation of CEOs of the 30 largest US corporations was on average $ 3.1 million. For British CEOs the comparable figure was $ 1.1 million; for German and French CEOs, $ 0.8 million; for Japanese CEOs, 0.5 million (Lazonick et al. 1997 ). According to the International Labour Organization, during the 1990s the time spent by Americans at their work place increased by per cent, whereas in Germany it decreased by 6 per cent (Inozemtsev 00). In Germany as well as in other European countries (Austria, Luxemburg, Scandinavian countries) labour and capital are being regarded as equal contributors to the corporate success, so the principle of codetermination (Mitbestimmung) is being adhered to -labour and capital co-determine the future course of the corporation. The interests of labour are directly protected by its representatives in the corporate supervisory board rather than solely through contract or governmental regulation as it is common in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Figure 1. Shifting of the accents in views of corporation
The structure and composition of the board is a significant indicator of the breadth of corporation's boundaries and of corporation's attitude towards stakeholders. The European corporation is characterized by two-tier board structure -an executive board subordinate to a multi-interest supervisory board, composed of representatives of owners, employees, banks, local government. In supervisory board business is also often represented because of the widespread crossholding of shares. A board composition like this one enables a variety of corporate stakeholders to participate in the planning and decision making process and thus guarantees long-term stability. Stability is also reinforced by the fact, that banks (in their capacity as shareholders, debt holders and proxies) and majority shareholders, who directly participate in the governance process, have long-term mutual relations and they are all interested in long-term stability. The Anglo-Saxon corporation is governed by a one-tier board composed of executive and non-executive directors in usual proportion 1:3. Despite the fact that the presence of the non-executive presumes objectivity of the corporate governance process, her or his independence is quite disputable (Boeva 001, Cowe 00, Kirkbride and Letza 005) . Employees' representation is considered a potential source of conflicts and is not allowed therefore. Even though American legislation in many states admits the interests of company's stakeholders to be taken into consideration by the boards of directors it does not oblige them to comply with. Generally shared view is that a board responsible for a variety of interests cannot bear responsibility for any of them. Thereby the interests of the shareholders, and of course those of the managers, are placed to the fore; this results in short-termism and perpetual threat by the market for corporate control in a world of instable environment.
We believe that the multi-interest board of directors is not only a source of long-termism and stability but it is also a guarantor for socially responsible behavior. The composition of the European corporate board is a clear demonstration that the corporation is made up of a variety of constituencies working together for their common benefit. The Anglo-Saxon reaction to the European multi-interest board of directors is explicitly given by Jacoby: "Its adoption would destroy the concept of the enterprise as an association of investors who pooled their capital in business venture, because investors would share authority over their funds with those who had invested nothing" (Jacoby 1973) . Shareowners are the only ones who are of importance, other stakeholders are nothing, and corporate social responsibility is confined to Friedman's cliché "social responsibility of business is to increase its profits" (Friedman 1970) . Although many Anglo-Saxon corporations engage in philanthropic actions, these are rather part of their public relations campaign than of their intrinsic philosophy (Porter and Kramer 00).
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The described differences between the European and the Anglo-Saxon corporation can be traced back to historical processes as well as to economical, socially political and cultural factors. An underlying cultural generator of the dispersed corporate ownership in the Anglo-Saxon countries is considered the entrepreneurial spirit that encourages widespread participation in equity investment, as well as the cultural aversion to concentrations of power (Cunningham 000) . Americans have always mistrusted concentrated power in their institutions (Jacoby 1973) . The Anglo-Saxon corporate system is based on the belief that society's well-being can be best achieved by pursuing individual interests. Handy finds the reason for "the American disease" in the whole business culture that "may have become distorted […], a culture underpinned by a doctrine that proclaimed the market king, always gave priority to the shareholder, and believed that business was the key engine of progress" (Handy 00). When asked "Whose company is it?" 97 per cent of the executives in Japan, 83 per cent of those in Germany and 78 per cent of the executives in France replied that the company exists for the interests of all stakeholders. At the other end of the spectrum managers in the US and UK by majorities of 76 per cent and 71 per cent respectively stated that shareholders' interests should be given priority (Allen and Gale 00). In the European social consciousness, economy is just one component of the social life rather than its determinant. This idea finds its roots in the European tradition of co-operation between economy and society, entrepreneurs and the state (Inozemtsev 00).
SPEcIFIc ProblEMS oF tHE corPorAtE StructurE
tHE ProblEMS
Most distinctive features of the corporate form of business are the separation between ownership and control, and dispersion of the corporation's ownership among a great number of anonym shareholders who are limitedly liable for the corporation's debts and practically not liable for its actions. This makes it possible for the corporate structure to attract huge amounts of venture capital, which fact along with its independent legal identity creates unique business privileges but on the other hand implies specific problems.
The principal-agent problem, which even Adam Smith and Karl Marx took notice of, is the most typical and broadly discussed among the problems of the corporate structure. At the basis of this problem lays the separation between corporate ownership and control. Shareholders (the principal) "exchange" the opportunity to receive earnings by limited risk and liability for the abdication of the right to exercise control over their property. By delegating this right to a professional team of managers (the agent), the principal entrusts the corporation to be controlled by non-owners that are prone to taking advantage of their position and using the power for pursuing their own interests. Thus the separation between ownership and control implies managerial opportunism as well as inefficient resource allocation. The problem is intensified by the information asymmetry between principal and agent. The acuteness of the principal-agent problem is directly linked to the principal's ability to monitor and exert control over the agent as well as to the price the principal pays for monitoring and control. The more expensive and looser the control over the agent is, the acuter the principalagent problem.
Ownership that is dispersed among numerous anonym owners entails another problem known as the free rider problem. This is the problem of the insufficient control over the corporate actions. A shareholder who owns a very small share of the corporation has neither the motivation nor the opportunity to actively exercise control over the corporate actions. He prefers to "ride free" on the control exercised by the other shareholders, i.e. any shareholder counts on somebody else's control over the managers. But as Mayer notes, if there is no-one to pull the cart it won't be able to set out, and that is why by such owners' attitude corporate governance can slip out of their control (Mayer 1996) . The acuteness of the free-rider problem is linked to the degree of ownership dispersion. The smaller the share a shareholder owns, the lower her or his interest in exercising control over the functioning of his property.
This leads to another problem of the dispersed corporate ownership -the power vacuum problem, which itself is directly linked to personalization of responsibility for corporate actions. Spencer (004) describes this problem as follows: "Shareholders own, and supposedly have control, but they do not actually control: the board and CEO actually control, but theoretically owe their power to the shareholders. As a result […] no-one has the ultimate duty to think about what the corporation should do and be: the only imperative is the directors' duty to act in the best interests of the company, which means the best interests of the shareholders, which means profit. If this leads the directors or managers to have to act against their conscience, well, that's their duty to shareholders. When shareholders see the company acting in ways their conscience would otherwise reject, well, the directors run the company, it's their responsibility." The more dispersed and anonym corporate ownership is, the acuter the power vacuum problem.
The corporate form of business is related to another problem known as the "veil of incorporation". At the basis of this problem lays the corporation's independent legal identity, which makes the corporate entity independent from its shareholders. As mentioned above, shareholders prefer investing in corporate ownership because of the incomes it provides by limited liability, which means that shareholders bear no responsibility for the corporate actions including violations of law. It also holds when owner of the corporation is another corporation, which is the case by the holding structures 7 , by which the "parent corporation" owns and wholly controls a number of "daughter corporations" being legally separate from and thus escaping from responsibility for their actions. This creates a legal opportunity for forming pyramid ownership structures, in which the "parent company", separated from its "daughter companies" through the "veil of incorporation", makes use of the benefits created by them without bearing responsibility for their actions, debts and even crimes.
Another problem of great significance is the externalization of costs, which consists in imposition of corporate costs to persons outside the corporation, often to the community or the nature environment (Monks and Minow 1991, Monks 1998, Spencer 004) . A popular example is the deposing of ecologically hazardous waste on the ocean's floor, which creates danger for all living beings while economizing corporate expenditures. When commenting on corporation's propensity to make others pay the price for its profits, Monks and Minow (1991) compare the corporation to "a shark that is a killing machineno malevolence, no intentional harm, just something designed with sublime efficiency for selfpreservation, which it accomplishes without any capacity to factor in the consequences to others". This problem is related to the personalization of responsibility for corporate actions in a world of legally limited liability, limited responsibility respectively. Corporation's shirking of responsibility automatically implies bearing the same responsibility by others -employees, creditors, nature, the whole society. Huge social and ecological costs are being transferred from business onto the society and future generations (Banzhaf 00).
coMPArISon bEtwEEn AnGlo-SAxon And EuroPEAn corPorAtIonS In tErMS oF tHE ProblEMS
We believe that the principal-agent problem, the free rider problem and the power vacuum problem are manifested more acutely in the Anglo-Saxon corporation than in the European one. We assume that the European system creates more favorable conditions for manifesting the "veil of incorporation" problem as well as for restricting the externalization of costs problem.
The acuteness of the principal-agent problem is intensified in the Anglo-Saxon corporation because of the expensive and ineffective participation of minority shareowners in the company's general assembly. Proxy voting is widely applied and proxies are very often members of the company's executive management team, i.e. members of the agent 8 . Thus it may turn out that the agent himself is the figure that most strongly influences the decision making process, which is supposed to be conducted by the principal and for protecting of the principal's interests against the agent. As a result, the major part of votes when electing the board of directors -which in theory is a representative and protector of the principal's interests -come from the agent. This obviously impedes the owner-principal from exerting control over the agent. 9 In the European corporation where corporate ownership is usually concentrated in the hands of larger shareholders, the principal-agent problem is not that intense. Large shareholders often directly participate in the supervisory board; interests of minority shareholders are usually protected by the banks, which are also members of the supervisory board in their capacity as shareholders, debt holders and minority shareholders' proxies. Although considered a potential source of conflicts, the latter guarantees real shareholders' representation and real control over the executive management. At the general assembly, large shareholders personally take part in and minority shareholders are represented by voting blocs. Banks are main proxies again and in Germany they sometimes hold up to 80 per cent of the general assembly votes. The usual problem in corporations with concentrated ownership is known as "strong blockholders, weak minorities" (Berglöf and von Thadden 1999) and consist in occupation of the power by the large shareholders and giving priority to their own interests.
The free rider problem is also more acutely manifested in the Anglo-Saxon corporation due to the corporate ownership dispersion. None of the minority shareholders has enough power to exert real control over the corporate governance process and prefers therefore to "ride free". When taking the control becomes indispensable (at obvious abuse and managerial opportunism, at decline in share prices) the minority shareholder proceed to passive control known as "voting with the feet" and consisting in selling the company's shares. This produces certain disciplining effect over the management -a great number of shareholders becoming dissatisfied and commencing to sell their shares could increase the expenditures needed for attracting new capital as well as actuate the market for corporate control. Exactly the described form of external control entails the short termism of the Anglo-Saxon corporation and its preference for the share-holder value. The concentrated ownership and the not so active stock market by the European system enable the corporation to avoid direct stock market influence and hostile takeovers. Even though the latter poses an obstacle to attracting venture capital for the companies, it constitutes an important stability factor. The role which employees and other stakeholders play in the European corporate governance process as well as the widespread crossholding of shares also prevent hostile takeovers. The control over corporate actions is internal, exercised by large shareholders, employees and other stakeholders and is therefore more effective and purposeful compared to the chaotic external market control. Internal control can be directed in accordance with the interest of the parties who exercise it; whereas external control disposed to the volition of the market's invisible hand rather pursues the one and only short-term interest of maximizing profits.
Power vacuum is induced by difficulties with legitimating the power in the corporation as a specific structure, in which ownership is separated from control. Economic power is in principle legitimated by ownership but in case ownership is dispersed and owners are anonym, we come to quite a contestable legitimacy. The board of directors and executive management of the Anglo-Saxon corporation get their power from an anonym crowd of small shareholders, which are not without reason called "speculators" by some authors (Monks and Minow 1991, Janisch 199, Handy 00) . Monks and Minow (1991) perceive the growing number of institutional investors as an opportunity to rebuild the trust in corporate directors and managers. "Institutional shareholders are the famous 900-pound gorilla, entitled to respect on account of size and might. More important, as fiduciaries, they are legally obligated to use that muscle and act as owners. For institutions, ownership is not so much a right as a responsibility". However according to the majority of the authors, the behavior of those "gorillas" is also quite passive and mainly directed to short-term profits (Hessel 00; Georgiev and Keremedchiev 1999) . In the European corporation by contrast, power is legitimated not only by ownership over financial capital but also by ownership over human and capital as well as by interests of all constituencies that have stake in the corporation. Therefore this power is more stable and more democratic. In closely held corporations where main owners are known by the community and participate in the governance process, the risk of irresponsible behavior is considerably lower precisely because of the absence of anonymity. In contrast to minority speculative shareholders, large shareholders as well as stakeholders are interested in the long-term survival and in the good public image of their company.
The widespread crossholding of shares by the European models makes it more likely for the "veil of incorporation" problem to manifest itself. Crossholding crates legal opportunity for corporations to mutually own each other and thus to mutually avoid responsibility. Anglo-Saxon countries impose legal limits not only to share-crossholding, but also to shares that banks and other financial institutions may own in one particular company. However Iwai demonstrates that legal restrictions can be evaded in practice. "Simple arithmetic ((1-1) x 5%) = 55% > 50%) tells us that a majority block of each corporation's shares could be effectively sealed off from real human beings without violating any […] legal restrictions on cross-holding" (Iwai 001 ). There are many cases illustrating how corporations have used the veil of incorporation to hide their crimes against people or nature (Spencer 004).
The externalization of costs problem is characteristic of the corporations by both corporate governance models as well as of many middle or small firms and even of people. It results from the rational impulse to maximize one's own benefits at the expense of others. However in corporations this is a problem of crucial importance because of their huge power and scale of activities. Banzhaf sees the reason for the irresponsibility of contemporary economic system in the fact that "[…] responsibility of real acting persons is segmented to their respective fields and responsibility for the whole is totally shifted upon the imaginary person 'the market'" (Banzhaf 00). However, as this problem is directly linked to personalization of responsibility in corporations, we suppose that its manifestation should be more limited in closely held European corporations where large owners are known in the community and responsibility for the externalization could be laid at their feet. We also believe that the European corporation's multi-interest board consisting of a variety of stakeholders and representatives of diverse institutions would be able to prevent externalization of negative effects.
concluSIon
We argue that corporations as a specific form of business with limited liability cause a variety of crucial problems for the society. The description of these problems draws the expanding circle of stakeholders affected by corporate activities -not only shareholders, but also employees, creditors, consumers, suppliers, local community, nature environment and society as a whole. The latter are not only affected, but are also strongly affecting corporations' development and longterm survival. We believe therefore that stakeholders should be included into the boundaries of the corporation's principal and that the problems discussed in this paper should be reduced to the common denominator of social responsibility and integrated into one problem -the multiprincipal-agent problem. In this way, the crucial problems caused by corporations could be regarded as one whole and could be simultaneously solved. Resolving this multiple problem requires appropriate mechanisms for minimizing agent's opportunism towards all stakeholders and towards the society as a whole. 
